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Meronymy has been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as a conceprual mapping wirhin a domain 
which involves a brand for' relarionship benveen enriries. In rhis anicle rhis conceprion is revised in order ro 
draw clearer dividing lines benveen meronymy and meraphor. on rhe one hand, and benveen meronvmy and 
relared polysemy phenomena, on rhe orher. Considerarions of mapping iypes and of rhe srarus of source-rarger 
relarionships are broughr ro bear for rhe undersranding of meronymy; also, an analysis of how meronymies are 
used referenrially and predicaiively is provided, which inrroduces rhe pragmaric dimension inro rhe accounr. 
Final-, ir is srressed rhar a sound undersranding of rhe cogniiive processes underlying meronymic expressions 
allows us ro undersrand berrer rheir communicarive porenrial. Then, ir is proposed rhar rhe acrual communicarive 
impon of meronymy (and of meraphor, for rhar marrer) can be besr srudied wirh rhe help of some of rhe 
conceprual rools provided in pragmarics by Relevance Theory. 
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RESUMEN 
lo metonimia ha sido descrita porlokoff y sus colaboradores como una proyección conceprual inrema a un 
dominio en la que una entidad se usa para representar a orra. En este anículo se revisa esta concepción con 
el fin de trazar, de la forma már clara posible, los límires enrre metonimia y metáfora, por una pane, y entre 
meronimia y otros fenómenos polisémicos relacionados, por orra. Se estudia la imponancia de los disrinros ripos 
de proyección y de la naturaleza de la relación enrre los dominios júenre y mera para la comprensión del 
fenómeno meronímico. Asimismo se estudian los usos referencia1 y predicarivo de la meronimia, lo que introduce 
la perspecriva pragmática en nuesrro estudio. Como conclusión. se hace hincapié en que una buena comprensión 
de los procesos cognirivos que subyacen al uso de expresiones meronímicas nos pennire entender mejor su 
porencial comunicarivo. Finalmente, se defienden las ventajas de la aplicación al esrudio del valor comunicarivo 
de la meronimia de algunas de las herramientas concepiuales desarrolladas en pragmárica por la Teoná de la 
Relevancia, aplicación que se puede hacer exrensible al caso de la meráfora. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Cognitive Linguistics metaphor and metonymy have both been explicitly recognized 
as central to a theory of knowledge organization (see Lakoff. 1987). Metaphor has been 
discussed at -length by Lakoff and his co-workers (see the seminal studies in Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980, Lakoff & Turner, 1989, Kovecses, 1990, Lakoff. 1993, Lakoff. 1996). 
However, metonymy has received considerably less attention, although some cognitive 
linguists have produced imponant studies on the topic (e.g.. Goossens, 1990, 1995. Croft, 
1993, Barcelona, 1996), and we fmd (rather brief) treatments in Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 
Lakoff & Turner (1989), Lakoff (1987), and Taylor (1989). 
The studies mentioned above deal with metonymy in cognitive terms as a conceptual 
operation which serves a stmcturing function of our knowledge and which, in the same-way 
as metaphor, has an experiential basis. However, they seem to neglect one imponant aspect 
of al1 knowledge systems: their use potential. It is not very reasonable to study the nature of 
a knowledge system without reference to its comrnunicative purpose. This is a point that 
applied linguist Henry Widdowson was most careful to make a long time ago, when 
discourse analysts and applied linguists were staning to explore the implications of the 
theories of knowledge organization for linguistic production and processing (see Widdowson, 
1984). Our own study attempts to incorporate the study of metonymy into the wider 
framework of communication theory. This will help us place the phenomenon in due 
perspective and criticize adequately the deficiencies of the existing accounts in cognitive 
linguistics. 
11. PROBLEMS IN DEFINING METONYMY 
Metaphor and metonymy have both been described by Lakoff and his co-workers as 
mappings between conceptual domains. By means of metaphor we understand and reason 
about one conceptual domain in terms of another. For example, if 1 say John is in troubie 
1 am conceptualizing trouble as if it were a container or a bounded region. Or take another 
common every-day expression such as He has reached his goal. In it, a person's goal is seen 
as the destination in a journey. So, what is relevant about metaphors is not that some 
expression is substituted for another but that there is some son of interaction between two 
conceptual domains. Thus, our knowledge about containers tells us, among other things, that 
these have boundaries that make it difficult to escape, and that once inside a container an 
entity is subject to the conditions prevailing in the container and may be affected by them. 
If a person is "in trouble", he or she is affected by it, and there rnay be impediments for him 
or her to solve the problematic situation (ie. to "get out" of the situation). These implications 
are to some extent part of the logic of the metaphor. Similarly, destinations are pan of a 
system which also has its own logic. Reaching a destination involves effort and overcoming 
impediments to travel. This same logic can be applied to the activity of figuratively reaching 
a goal. It is because of logical implications like these that the following sentences make full 
sense: 
(1) At last he reached his goal 
(2) Too many drawbacks prevented him from reaching his goal 
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(3) It waslwasn't easy for him to reach his goal 
(4) He's in trouble and he's doing nothing to get out of it 
(5) He's so deep in trouble there's not much he can do about it 
A metaphor is, therefore, a rnapping (Le. a set of correspondences) between two 
conceptual domains where one dornain (called the source) serves to structure and reason 
about another (called the target). 
Metonyrny has also been described as a rnapping, but of a rather different kind. Consider 
the differences between the two following expressions, which we borrow from Lakoff & 
Johnson (1980:35): 
(6) Inflation robbed me of my savings 
(7) The harn sandwich is waiting for his check 
The word "inflation" does not refer to a person, but to an entity to which we impute 
human qualities (we see inflation as an adversary). In contrast, the expression "harn 
sandwich" does refer to a person, but without ascribing human qualities to it. According to 
Lakoff & Johnson, the former is a case of rnetaphor which we cal1 personification: in it, a 
non-hurnan entity is rnapped onto a hurnan entity. The latter is a case of metonymy: in it, one 
entity is made to stand for another. 
But there is more that we can say about these two expressions. In (6) inflation is seen as 
an adversary that does harm to the speaker. This idea is the central implication of the 
rnetaphor (ie. that inflation has done the speaker as much harm as a thief that had taken al1 
his or her savings would have done). And in principie this implication is the only one that 
the speaker is entitled to expect the addressee to derive. However, the addressee may want 
to derive further irnplications by exploring the comections between the source and the target 
in the metaphor. For example, a thief's unlawful actions may be felt to be treacherous (i.e. 
the speaker, as an investor, rnay have been caught by surprise). Or the speaker rnay feel he 
or she has to take precautions for the future (for example, by reinvesting his or her rnoney 
more wisely). Less central implications like these account for the appropriateness of the 
following expansions of example (6): 
(8) Inflation robbed me of my savings, but 1 won't let that happen again. 
(9) Inflation robbed me of rny savings, which 1 didn't expect. 
(10) Inflation robbed me of my savings, which was a tremendous nuisance. 
and they also account for the strangeness of the following (which would be best interpreted 
as examples of irony): 
(11) ?What a nice thing inflation robbed me of my savings! 
(12) ?Inflation robbed me of rny savings and 1 will let that happen again. 
(13) ?Inflation robbed me of my savings just as 1 wanted. 
In contrast to what happens in the metaphor in (6), the metonymy in (7) does not 
seem to convey any special irnplication, neither primary nor secondary. In a restaurant 
context, (7) rnay well be used by a waitress as a convenient device to identify a custorner. 
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In other words, (7) is a definite description whose purpose in the context given is to achieve 
successful reference in an economical way. The waitress might have said something like The 
customer who has ordered a harn sandwich is waiting for his check, but this would be a 
rather cumbersome expression if compared to the more straightforward one used in (7). 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), and Lakoff & Turner (1989), explicitly deal with 
metonymic expressions like (7) in terms of mappings. However, as they are careful to point 
out, the mappings are carried out within a single conceptual domain, which, they argue, is 
what ultimately makes the difference between metaphor and metonymy. In this view, the ham 
sandwich is mapped to (Le. it stands for) the customer and it belongs to the same conceptual 
domain (ie. the restaurant situation) as the customer. Furthermore, the ham sandwich is made 
to stand for the customer because of its particular salience from the point of view of the 
speaker's concerns. We can illustrate this if we compare (7) above with other expressions 
like The brown wallet is waiting for his check or The pair of shoes is waiting for his check. 
The former would require a very different perspectivization of the restaurant situation, while 
the latter would be particularly infelicitous to refer to a restaurant customer, unless we had 
a rather uncomrnon context. 
To sum up, Lakoff and his collaborators define metonymy as a conceptual mapping 
within a single domain where one entity in a conceptual domain stands for another entity in 
the same domain. or for the whole domain. They also contend that metonymy is used 
primarily for reference (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989: 103) and that metonymies are not 
random occurrences but make up conventional systems. In this connection, Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980) provide us with a sarnple list of some cornrnon metonymies like PART FOR WHOLE 
(e.g. We don 't hire longhairs), PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (e.g. I ' I I  have a Lowenbrau), 
OBJECT USED FOR USER (e.g. The sax has the j7ue today), CONTROLLER FOR 
CONTROLLED (e.g. Nixonbombed Hanoi), INSTITUTION FORPEOPLE RESPONSIBLE 
(e. g . Exxon has raised its prices again), THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION (e. g . Wall 
Street is in a panic), and THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT (e.g. Watergate changed our 
poli tic^)^ 
However, not al1 these observations are tmly definitional for metonymy and cannot 
be used to account for the phenomenon adequately as they stand. We can provisionally point 
out the following problems: 
- It is pointless to say that metonymies are prirnarily used referentially unless it is 
explained why this is so. Note that metaphors can also be used referentially. For example, 
an expression like The pig is waiting for his check might be used by a waitress to refer to a 
particularly unpleasant customer who has kept harassing her. Conversely, it is perfectly 
feasible and appropriate to make a predicative use of a metonymy, as in the utterance John 
is a real brain, meaning that John is extremely intelligent. 
- Metonymies are said to involve a 'stand for' relationship. Thus, "the ham sandwich" 
in (7) stands for the customer who has ordered a harn sandwich. But we find the same 
relationship in The pig is waiting for his check, where "the pig" also stands for the customer. 
This observation points to a close connection between the so-called 'stand for' relationship 
and the referential use of both metaphorical and metonymic expressions. 
- Making a distinction between mappings within a single domain and across domains, 
although tenable, is a rather tricky issue. We need some solid criteria that help us to 
determine unequivocally when we have cases of domain-interna1 or domain-externa1 
mappings. The existence of sub-domains is usually clear in cases of straightforward part- 
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whole/whole-pan relationships or when we have taxonomies (the 'is-a-type-of' relationship). 
But in other cases we need to speak of sub-domains in a rather loose sense. For example, in 
the sentence John is afine working hand, since a hand is a physical and functional pan of 
John (as a person), the domain-interna1 mapping between John and his hand is fairly 
straightforward. But in The harn sandwich is waiting for his check, the ham sandwich is not 
a pan of the person referred to in the same sense as a hand would be. The difference is al1 
the more obvious if we compare these related expressions: 
(14) The fine working hand is waiting for his pay cheque 
(15) John is a ham sandwich 
While it is possible to use the expression "fine working hand" both referentially and 
predicatively and preserve the domain-interna1 nature of the mapping, it is impossible to use 
the expression "ham sandwich" predicatively and have a domain-interna1 mapping at the same 
time, as evidenced by example (15). This is so because a hand is more readily (and more 
obviously) identified as pan of the conceptual structure for 'customer' than a ham sandwich. 
The ham sandwich-customer relationship is mediated by the restaurant context. But 
there are cases where we also have a rather loose association between two concepts without 
the intervention of any specific context. In a sense, it is possible to say that for the mapping 
to occur within a domain the speaker needs to perform a mental operation by means of which 
one domain is made to be subsumed, sometimes temporarily -as in the ham sandwich 
example-, under another. For example, in He bought a Picasso, the work of an  may be 
thought to be pan of Picasso's central activity in his life, and therefore, loosely speaking, 
pan of him. This case is comparable to clear cases of whole-pan relationships, like Hefilled 
up the car (meaning that he filled the petrol tank). In Supennan will probably no longer be 
able to walk again, "Superman" (the film character) stands for the actor (Christopher Reeve), 
and can be loosely thought of as pan of his life. This case if comparable to clear cases of 
pan-whole relationships, like the use of a body pan for a type of person (consider 
expressions like Al1 hands on deck!, He is a good head for sums, She's just another pretzy 
face, etc.). 
Now, consider: 
(16) God is an all-seeing eye 
This expression may be used to emphasize God's alleged ability to see and observe 
everything and everyone when it is his will. If we want to divide metaphor from metonymy 
on the grounds of whether we have a mapping within a domain or a mapping across domains, 
an expression like (16) is problematic. Most believers in God would not contend that God 
actually has eyes in the physical sense. So, if the relationship between the concepts 'eye' and 
'God' is to be one of pan-whole, this has to be in a metaphorical sense. That is to say, God 
has eyes only figuratively in an anthropomorphic conception. At the sarne time, (16) makes 
an predicative use of the 'eyel-'God' metonymy to highlight God's observing powers. That 
this is so will be al1 the more evident if we compare (16) to (17) below: 
(17) John is al1 eyes 
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People are said to be al1 eyes when they are very 0bSe~an t  as if constantly looking 
around thern eagerly. A crucial difference with (16) is that the relationship between 'eye' and 
'John', unlike that between 'eye' and 'God', does not rest on a rnetaphor. In (16) there is 
first a mapping frorn the domain of human beings, with physical anributes, to the dornain of 
spiritual beings, with non-physical attributes but with comparable functional attributes. This 
would be a rnetaphoric mapping since two different domains are involved. Then, there is a 
second rnapping according to which an eye stands for its function. Finally, as a result of a 
third rnapping -between 'eye' and 'God'-, God is made to epitomize observation capabilities 
with the implication that since he watches everything, he also watches one's deeds. 
From the discussion above it may be provisionally (but safely) concluded that 
rnetonymy is distinguished from metaphor in that metonymy involves a conceptual rnapping 
within a dornain, while rnetaphor involves a mapping across domains. The predorninantly 
referential character of metonymy is not a definitional criterion, nor is it to say that 
rnetonymic correspondences are of the 'stand for' type, versus the 'is a' type for rnetaphors. 
Our discussion also points to the need of making an adequate distinction between process and 
result in understanding metaphor and metonymy. Since both share referential and predicative 
uses, we may have to find the difference in the type of mapping process of which they f o m  
part. But before we go into this question, it will prove useful to discuss Croft's (1993) 
distinction between 'domain mapping' and 'domain highlighting'. While the analysis of 
mapping types allows us to distinguish metonymy from rnetaphor, the study of 'domain 
highlighting' will enable us to draw the boundaries between rnetonyrny and related polysemy 
phenornena. 
111. DOMAIN HIGHLIGHTING 
Croft (1993) follows Lakoff and his collaborators in arguing that metonymy involves 
a mapping within a domain (or domain rnatrix). He adds, however, that metonymy alrnost 
invariably involves a conceptual effect called "dornain highlighting". To give one of his 
exarnples, think of the expression: 
(18) Proust is tough to read 
In the encyclopedic view of semantics, which cognitivists uphold, the works of Proust 
are part of the concept 'Proust' although they are not as central as, for example, the fact that 
Proust was a person. The metonymic shift from Proust to Proust's work is quite natural since 
Proust is famous as a writer and the work produced is a salient element in the domain of 
creative activity. The effect produced by the shift (i.e. "domain highlighting) is one of 
making primary what is otherwise (in its literal rneaning) a secondary domain. Domain 
highlighting is a necessary but not sufficient condition for metonymy. It also occurs in other 
types of lexical ambiguity. To borrow two of Croft's examples in this respect, contrast: 
(19) This book is heavy 
(20) This book is a history of Iraq 
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The concept 'book' is profiled at least in two primary domains: physical objects and 
semantic content. In (19) the domain of physical objects is highiighted; in (20) it is the 
semantic content domain that is highiighted. (This is due to the requirements of the predicates 
'heavy' and 'a history of Iraq' respectively). Although the concepts symbolised by "this 
book" are different in (19) and (20), the word "book" is not to be treated as metonymic 
since, according to Croft, the elements profiled in each domain are highiy intrinsic, that is, 
they make no reference to external entities (see Langacker, 1987:160). So, in this view, the 
difference between metonymy and other cases of domain highlighting would have to do with 
the extent to which the highlighted domain is considered to be intrinsic to the concept. As 
an example of this, Croft examines the following two uses of "window": 
(21) 1 broke the window 
(22) She came in through the bathroom window 
We may sumrnarize Croft's explanation as follows: the concept 'window' can be 
interpreted in the shape and physical object domains; being a physical object is intrinsic to 
the concept but the interpretation of window as an opening in the shape domain is somewhat 
extrinsic because it makes reference to external entities around it; however, the shape domain 
for 'window' seems to be less extrinsic than Proust's writings for 'Proust'; so, the example 
about Proust above is a.clear case of metonymy, but the status of (22) is not so clear. 
Examples like these tend to show that there is "a continuum between clear cases of 
metonymy and the highlighting of highly intrinsic facets of a concept" (Croft 1993:350). 
While we may agree to some extent with this conclusion and with the relevance of 
the highlighting process for the understanding of metonymy, there are some cmcial aspects 
of Croft's account which seem to be essentially misled. We shall now re-examine his analysis 
of examples (2 1) and (22) above to prove that it is not intrinsicness but centrality that makes 
the difference between cases of metonymy and other cases of domain highlighting. In fact, 
the misuse of the concept of intrinsicness in semantic characterizations has led Croft to view 
(22) as closer to being an example of metonymy than (21), while it may argued that it is (21) 
that shares more with the clearest cases of metonymy. To this we shall add the observation 
that highiighting is applied to metaphor as well and therefore this concept is not useful to 
distinguish metaphor from metonymy. 
First, let us address the question of the intrinsicness of the domains involved in the 
different uses of the word "window". A property is intrinsic if it makes no reference to 
external entities. Langacker (1987: 160) gives the example of shape for physical objects, in 
contrast to size, since size is understood by comparison with other objects. If we apply 
Langacker's logic, a window is a physical object with a certain shape and size; while size 
is an extrinsic property, shape is an intrinsic property of windows. Interestingly enough, 
Croft -who intends to apply Langacker's notion of "intrinsicness"- has reached exactly the 
opposite conclusion. The source of this contradiction is perhaps to be found in that shape can 
be thought of both as an intrinsic and an extrinsic property of things. It is intrinsic to the 
extent that, to use Langacker's own words, "it reduces to relations between the parts of an 
object and does not require interaction or comparison with other entities" (Langacker, 
1987: 160-161). It is extrinsic to the extent that, when applied to characterize a given entity, 
it singles the entity out from others3. Thus, if one uses the word "window" to describe a 
physical object in contrast to other objects in a hardware store showroom, which is Croft's 
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illustration (Croft, 1993: 349), shape becomes an extrinsic property. But if one is thinking 
of a window in a wall, a roof, or the side of a vehicle -the places where one would normally 
expect to find it- its shape is an intrinsic property. 
If the interpretation of 'window' both in the shape domain and in the physical object 
domain involves intrinsic properties of the entity. it is not accurate to say, even using Croft's 
own logic, that (22) is (nearly) a case of metonymy, at least on the basis of its purported 
"extrinsicness". But the fact is that it could be argued that (21) is a clearer case of metonymy 
than (221, since breaking a window is normally interpreted as breaking the "window-pane": 
'window' maps onto 'window-pane' (the whole object maps onto a pan of the object). So we 
need to find a more solid criterion to distinguish metonymic from non-metonymic uses. Note 
that it is possible to have a window without a pane (it still serves its function as an opening 
in a wall that lets light come in and lets you look out), so (21) focuses on a non-central (or 
more peripheral) aspect of the concept. (22). on the other hand, focuses on a central aspect. 
since it is impossible to have a window without an opening. Degree of centrality, therefore, 
seems to be the criterion we are looking for. Precisely, Langacker (1987) has explained 
centrality in terms of a combination of criteria: it correlates with the extent to which a 
specification is conventional (shared by a comrnunity), generic (not idiosyncratic with a 
particular item), intrinsic (making no reference to externa1 entities), and characteristic (unique 
to the class of items concerned). Intrinsicness is only one of the criteria. 
The same division between central and peripheral specifications explains why (19) is 
not but (20) might be a case of metonymy. A book is a number of sheets of paper bound 
together. As such, it has the intrinsic property of having weight. The predicate 'heavy' in 
(19) applies to this central description. We also know that books have information written 
in them, but the book in (20) has historical information about Iraq. This semantic 
specification violates al1 the centrality criteria except perhaps intrinsicness: books are not 
conventionally histories of Iraq; then, being a history of Iraq is not unique to the class of 
items designated by "book", nor is it generic knowledge. So. (20), contrary to what Croft 
seems to suggest, qualifies as a case of metonymy, although to a lesser extent [han other 
cases like (18) which violates al1 the centrality criteria including intrinsicness. 
Let us now turn to the question of "domain highlighting". Remember that Croft 
argues that metonymy makes primary a domain which is secondary in its literal meaning. 
This description seems to hold for examples where a whole domain stands for a significant 
pan of the same domain. But consider a different case: 
(23) John is a brain 
Here "brain" stands for "a person with good intellectual abilities"; part of a domain 
stands for the whole domain and at the same time highlights a feature which is 
conventionally, generically, intrinsically, and characteristically associated with brains: 
intelligence. So, interpretation here does not proceed by making primary a secondary domain 
but rather by singling out a very central feature of brains which is then attributed to John. 
In this respect, (23) is not very different from some metaphors. Consider: 
(24) John is a lion 
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In this metaphor, there is a conventional feature of lions ('courage') which is 
attributed to John. Through cultural convention based on experience (our obsewation of the 
instinctive behaviour of lions), courage has become a central feature of our concept of lion. 
In a way similar to what happened with intelligence in (23), it is this central feature that is 
highlighted in (24) and then attributed to John. 
The fact that there are clear cases of metonymy where no secondary domain is 
highlighted does not invalidate the relevance of the notion of 'domain highlighting' for the 
description of metonymy but rather places this notion in a different perspective. First, 
highiighting works both for metonymy and for metaphor. Second. it works in different ways 
depending on the status of the relationship between the source and target domains involved 
and on the primary or secondary nature of the source. There are two possibilities for the 
relationship between source and target domains: one, that the target is a conceptually 
significant element of the source, as in the Proust example; two, that the source is part of 
the target, as in the ham sandwich and related examples above. If the target (e.g. Proust's 
work in (18)) is included within the source (i.e. Proust) we will have a clear case of 
metonymy oniy if the target is a secondary or non-central domain. This makes us regard 
expressions like (22) or similar ones (e.g. She looked out of the window), where the 
purported target has primary status as non-metonymic or, in any event, as borderline cases. 
If it is the source that forms part of the target, it is imrnaterial whether the source is deemed 
to be a primary or a secondary domain. Thus, in (7) 'ham sandwich' is secondary, but in 
(23) 'brain' is primary. The 'ham sandwich' stands for 'the customer who has ordered a ham 
sandwich' and 'brain' for 'person with excellent intellectual abilities'. In both one relevant 
attribute is singled out, highlighted, and used to talk about the target, in (7) referentially, and 
in (23) predicatively. 
It may be additionally noted that the mapping process precedes and motivates the 
highlighting process. Thus, in (23) the explicit correspondence between John (the target) and 
the brain (the source) leads the hearer to look for the most relevant feature in the source to 
attribute to the target. In (18), the hearer, in being confronted with the absence of an explicit 
target domain, needs to look for it within the source domain. Much the same occurs in (21) 
and (22) where the hearer has to find out whether the speaker is referring to a window-pane 
or to an opening in a wall. 
IV. TYPES OF MAPPING 
Examples (23) and (24) above suggest that the crucial difference between metaphor 
and metonymy is not a matter of domain mapping versus domain highiighting. Previously, 
we saw that other criteria, like its frequent referential use and the 'stand for' relationship 
between source and target are not valid (since they hold both for metaphor and metonymy) 
and that the oniy tenable difference has to do  with the domain-interna1 or domain-extemal 
nature of the mapping. If this is true, and since a mapping process lies at the base of both 
metaphor and metonymy, it might be profitable to describe them in terms of the type of 
mapping and the effects involved. 
Let us tum again to the metaphor in (24). It is obvious that it conveys more than the 
rough paraphrase "John is courageous". And it must do so, otherwise why bother to use the 
metaphor at al1 rather than the paraphrase? This point is al1 too obvious, too. What is more 
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interesting is to see how this happens. The process has been explained in detail by Lakoff 
& Turner (1989). They discuss the metaphor Achilles is a lion, which for them is a case of 
the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS mapping. This metaphor is based on an interaction between 
the common-sense theory of things called the GREAT CHAIN and the GENEFüC IS 
SPECIFIC metaphor. The GREAT CHAIN is defined by attributes and behaviour which 
apply to each form of being (humans, animals, plants, complex objects, natural physical 
things) in a hierarchy. For example, animals are endowed with instinctual attributes and 
behaviour, to which humans add higher-order attributes and behaviour. The GENEFüC IS 
SPECIFIC metaphor is used to single out from specific concepts common generic conceptual 
structure. The interaction allows us to understand animal behaviour in terms of human 
character. On the other hand, the PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS mapping leads us to understand 
human character in terms of animal behaviour. In Achilles is a lion this results in our 
understanding Achilles's courage in terms of our knowledge about a lion's "courage". 
According to Lakoff & Turner (1989: 196), "when we understand Achilles in terms 
of a lion. we map the lion onto Achilles, the lion's "courage" onto Achilles's courage, and 
the relation berween the lion and his "courage" onto the relation berween Achilles and his 
courage" (emphasis theirs). However, this is not entirely correct. Note that by experience- 
based convention (e.g. our knowledge about the way lions chase their quany or defend their 
territory and offspring) we single out only one aspect of the source (animal behavioural 
attributes) and make them correspond with one aspect of the target (human behavioural 
attributes). There are other aspects of the target, such as Achilles's physical appearance, his 
manners, and so on, which play little if any role in the metaphor. Thus, we think of Achilles 
more readily as a fierce, indefatigable fighter than as a strong, weighty, and powerful man. 
We have only one mapping (or one correspondence), not three. 
Lakoff and his collaborators have failed to note the irnportance of distinguishing 
between those mappings where al1 the implications are derived by virtue of a single 
correspondence -as is the case with (24) and similar metaphors- from those characterized by 
invoking a fully-fledged system of correspondences. For example, think of the following 
expression uttered by an infuriated father who is scolding his teenage son for patent 
misbehaviour: 
(25) You are going nowhere that way! 
In the context given, this expression is metaphorical and can be explained under the LIFE 
IS A JOURNEY mapping (see Lakoff & Tumer, 1989:3-4). It must be interpreted as a 
warning from the father to the son about the son's predictable future. In this metaphor, the 
son is seen as a traveller who is unaware that he has taken a path that leads to an undesirable 
destination. The path is mapped onto the son's way of living (what he is doing) and the 
destination onto a life's goals. It is impossible to interpret (25) correctly if we leave out any 
of the relevant correspondences. Of course, there are other elements of a journey which are 
not called up -since they are not needed- but which are essential ingredients of the source for 
other expressions, like the vehicle in He jumped on the bandwagon, or the type of path in 
My life has been a long, bumpy road. 
We can, therefore, make a distinction between one correspondence and many- 
correspondence mappings. There are two differences between these mapping types. One is 
that while many-correspondence mappings are primarily used to structure and reason about 
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as many aspects as possible of fairly abstract notions (such as love, life, quantity, etc.), one- 
correspondence mappings serve primarily to bring into focus and reason about one aspect of 
the target domain (like Achilles's instinctual courage) and are applied to concrete target 
domains. Another difference is related to the communicative effect of the mapping since 
many-correspondence mappings provide us with a wider range of meaning implications to 
explore, a point which will be taken up again in the next section. 
So far. our discussion has made it possible for us to identify metonymies as cases of 
one-correspondence mappings where the target may be a pan of the source or the source a 
part of the target. Metaphors based on one correspondence share most of their features with 
metonymies of the latter type. With the other type of metonymy, since the highlighting 
process has a different function, the similarities are fewer. Finally, the number of similarities 
between metaphor and metonymy is considerably smaller when it comes to cases of many- 
correspondence metaphors. If we take these obse~ations into account together with our 
previous discussion on the role of primary and secondary domains for metonymy we will be 
in a position to formulate a full definition of metonymy in cognitive terms. Thus, a 
metonymy may be defined as a one-correspondence conceptual mapping within a domain 
where. if the target is part of the source, the target is not a primary or central sub-domain 
of the source. 
V .  CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATIONS 
We have been able to see that it is possible to make both predicative and referential 
uses of metonymy. The same is true of metaphor, to such an extent that metaphors and 
metonymies sometimes bear a very close resemblance from the point of view of their 
communicative effects. Consider the following examples, borrowed from Ruiz de Mendoza 
(1996a): 
(26) When it comes to debating, John is a real lion 
(27) When it comes to debating, John is the lion 
(28) When it comes to debating, John is a real brain 
(29) When it comes to debating, John is the brain 
(30) When it comes to debating, we need 'the lion' to be with us 
(31) When it comes to debating, we need 'the brain' to be with us 
In al1 these exarnples there is an interesting combination of mappings. On the one 
hand. we have the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, which has been discussed by Lakoff & 
Johnson (1980). In this metaphor we see the person we are arguing with as an opponent in 
a battle. We plan tactics, aaack, defend, and counterattack; we gain or lose ground, we win 
or we lose. On the other hand, we have the correspondence A PERSON IS A LION, which 
belongs to the more general PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphor. and the correspondence 
A PERSON IS A PART OF THE BODY, which is metonymic in the sense that it is interna1 
to a domain, as discussed above, but which actually belongs to a more general mapping 
labelled PEOPLE ARE ENTITIES, which, interestingly enough, would cover both cases of 
metaphor and of metonymy. It may be noted that (26) and (28) make a predicative use of the 
one-correspondence mappings involved. The rest of the examples make referential use of 
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them. It is when we make referential use of a mapping that a 'stand for' relationship may be 
said to hold between the source and target. In predicative uses we have an 'is a' relationship. 
independently of whether the mapping is carried out within a domain or across domains. 
It is also evident that whether the mapping is domain-interna1 or domain-externa1 is 
irrelevant in terms of the communicative effect achieved by means of it. In example (26), "a 
lion" can be roughly paraphrased as "a person with unyielding courage and determination"; 
and "a brain" in (28) as "a person with excellent intellectual abilities". Note incidentally that 
the hedge "real" reinforces the prominence of the attribute that is singled out by the mapping. 
Then, in (27) and (30) "the lion" means "the person with unyielding courage and 
determination", and "the brain" in (29) and (31) is "the person with excellent intellectual 
abilities". (27) and (29) are equative sentences where subject and complement are co- 
referential. Note now that the presence of hedges in referential uses would be highly 
infelicitous (we would not say "the real lion" or "the real brain") since in such uses attributes 
are not discussed but taken for granted and highlighted to achieve successful reference. 
However, the nature of the mapping system does make a difference. Thus, when not 
used for mere referential purposes, predicative uses of one-correspondence mappings serve 
to place in focus and reason about a single relevant aspect of a conceptual domain. Many- 
correspondence mappings, on the other hand, serve the additional purpose of helping us to 
explore al1 the domain in question. It follows that many-correspondence mappings are richer 
in meaning implications. 
One interesting thing about our account of metaphoric and metonymic mappings is 
that it is fully compatible with the basic requirements of Sperber & Wilson's (1986) well- 
known Relevance Theory. These authors see verbal communication as a form of ostensive 
behaviour intended to attract the hearer's attention. For an ostensive stimulus to achieve its 
purpose optimally it must keep a balance between cognitive economy and the communicative 
effects produced. Communicative effects are called contextual effects since they involve some 
sort of modification in the set of assumptions (ie. the hearer's mental context or cognitive 
environment) that the hearer brings to bear in the communication process. A verbal message 
will be optimally relevant for the hearer if it achieves (at least) the desired contextual effects 
for the least processing effort. Contextual effects are achieved when the newly-presented 
information interacts with the hearer's cognitive environment by strengthening, contradicting, 
or combining with an existing assumption. The combination of new and existing information 
produces contextual implications'. 
Relevance theorists see metaphor as an economical way of producing a large amount 
of contextual effects by implication. Consider the brief analysis carried out by Blakemore 
(1991: 163) of the metaphor My neighbour is a dragon. According to this author, metaphors 
put us to some extra processing effort which is only justified if it is offset by the adequate 
range of contextual effects. The hearer is thus encouraged to explore a range of contextual 
implications other than the central (or strong) ones. My neighbour is a dragon conveys the 
strong implications "my neighbour is fierce" and "my neighbour is unfriendly". Other non- 
central (or weak) implications may have to do with the neighbour's appearance or with her 
overall behaviour. Since these are weaker implications the hearer must take a greater 
responsibility for their recovery, but they justify the speaker's utterance. Also, since it would 
be extremely difficult to find an alternative way of conveying the same range of implications 
(e.g. by means of paraphrases), the metaphor turns out to be a most convenient (and thereby 
economical) device. 
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Blakemore's analysis is based on a one-correspondence metaphor, but it may be 
extended to cover cases of many-correspondence metaphors. Consider again example (25) 
above. In it, the central correspondence is GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. From it, we 
obtain the strong implication that the hearer leads a purposeless life (Le. a life with no 
"destination").. Other weaker implications may be derived from the central one in 
combination with the rest of the relevant correspondences. For example, on the basis of the 
goal-destination correspondence, we rnay reason that it is possible for the hearer to find an 
altemative path which leads to a good, beneficia1 destination. The correspondence between 
the type of path and the hearer's way of living allows us to reason about the misled nature 
of the hearer's activities (there is no point in following a path that leads nowhere). And the 
way we understand the hearer's character traits is based on the traveller-hearer 
correspondence (what kind of person would take a path that leads nowhere?). 
Think now of this other example: 
(32) He crashed right after take-off 
Imagine (32) as a remark on the fate of a basketball player's initially promising but 
eventually short-lived career in the context of an alcohol abuse problem. (32) is a case of 
the A CAREER IS A JOURNEY metaphor: a basketball player's career is a journey by 
aeroplane. The traveller maps onto the player, the vehicle onto the player's activities, the 
take-off onto the beginning of the career, the intended destination onto the player's goals and 
aspirations, the accident onto the sudden halt in the player's career, and the cause of the 
accident onto the player's excessive drinking. The central correspondence is, as with (25). 
DESTINATIONS ARE GOALS, and [he strongest implication is that the player ruined his 
promising career not long after it had started (i.e. he didn't fulfil his aspirations). But we 
have a wider range of contextual effects. Thus, as with aeroplane accidents, we feel that the 
whole event had better never come about, that perhaps something could have been done about 
the player's problem before it proved fatal. In the source, we know that during take-off a lot 
more energy is consumed than during the flight. In the target the beginnings of a career as 
a professional player are harder and require much time, effort, and sacrifice. These efforts 
could have been highIy rewarding but they were in vain since the player's activities carne to 
an abrupt end just as the doomed flight comes to a sudden, unexpected, and unwanted end. 
In the source we know that an aeroplane can cover very long distances in a very short time; 
in the target we may reason that, much the same way, a lot could be expected of this player 
(progress is seen as movement towards the destination). But the prornising prospects are 
thwarted by the untimely accident. And so on. 
The cases we have examined in terms of Blakemore's analysis involve predicative 
uses of metaphor. We must assume that they would hold for cases of predicative use of 
metonymy as well. Thus, in John is the brain, there is a central implication about John's 
intelligence, and perhaps weaker implications about his behaviour, attitudes, etc. But since 
metonymies are restricted to one-correspondence mappings the number of contextual effects 
is srnaller than with many-correspondence metaphors. 
Referential uses of metaphor and metonymy can also be explained in terms of the 
balance between cognitive economy and contextual effects. Consider again examples (30) and 
(31) above. In (30) "the lion" stands for "the person that can be appropriately called the 
lion". Similarly, in (31) "the brain" stands for "the person that can be appropriately called 
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the brain". "The lion" and "the brain" refer each to a person that has a nurnber of 
"quintessential" properties which are highlighted as a result of the rnapping, as we saw 
before. The person is identified by these properties. So, al1 the contextual effects rnotivated 
by the rnappings serve to u ~ q u e l y  identify the referent. Note that the rnetaphor and 
rnetonyrny achieve in a synthetic, econornical, less curnbersorne way a better referential effect 
than could be achieved by rneans of a more elaborate definite description, as is the case with 
(33) below: 
(33) When it comes to debating, we need 'the person rhat has excellent intellectual 
capabilities' to be with us. 
Similar considerations hold for rnetonyrnies where the source is part of the target. 
Take the following rnetonyrnies, which we quoted at the beginning of this article: 
(34) 
Exxon has raised its prices again 
Wall Street is in a paNc 
Watergate changed our politics 
Each of these rnetonymies is an econornical way of referring to a fairly cornplex 
target: "the people responsible for the price policies in Exxon", "the investors that buy and 
se11 their stocks in the Wall Street stock rnarket". and "the so-called Watergate affair" 
respectively. The purpose of this type of rnetonyrny is not to invite the hearer to explore a 
large nurnber of contextual effects but rather to describe a cornplex target in a simple way 
without irnpairing cornmunicative success. 
Metaphor and rnetonyrny are cases of what Sperber & Wilson (198516) have called 
"loose uses" of language or "loose talk". They describe the circurnstances in which it 
happens as follows: 
The speaker wants to comrnunicate to her hearer a certain set of propositions P , .  . . 
P,. They are al1 quite easily derivable as logical or contextual irnplications of a 
proposition Q whose truth she does not believe and does not want to guarantee. The 
best way of conveying this information rnay be to express the single proposition Q, 
as long as the hearer has sorne way of selecting those of its logical and contextual 
irnplications that the speaker intends to convey, and ignoring the others. (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1985186, in Davis, 1991: 545)5. 
Since it is precisely the rnapping and highlighting processes discussed above that assist 
the hearer in selecting the contextual irnplications that the speaker intends to convey, the 
cognitive account of rnetaphor and rnetonyrny is a pre-requisite for the pragrnatic account, 
in such a way that the latter becornes cornplernentary to the fonner. At the sarne time, the 
pragrnatic account provides a general frarnework within which it is possible to define the use 
potential of rnetaphoric and rnetonyrnic rnappings. 
This application of Relevance Theory is contrary to Papafragou's (1995) account of 
rnetonyrny within the sarne frarnework. First, PapafragoAA argues against the cognitive 
sernantics approach to rnetonyrny and erroneously states that this approach can but deal with 
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the most conventionalised metonymies. She suggests that instead of giving inventories of 
mappings, it is better to find a general pragmatic criterion powerful enough to predict "which 
metonymies are possible in a given context on the basis of the hearer's estimated capacity 
to understand them" (Papafragou, 1995: 148). Finally, she argues that metonymy is a non- 
descriptive use of language (an "echoic use" in relevance-theoretic terms) which (i) 
introduces a new name (the expression of a non-lexicalized ad hoc concept), and (ii) has as 
its intended referent something which does not fall under the normal denotation of the 
expression (Papafragou, 1995 : 155). 
This view has been discussed in greater detail in Ruiz de Mendoza (1996a). Here it 
will be enough to point out some of its most fundamental problems. First, even though in 
Relevance Theory cornrnunication and cognition are closely related phenomena, Papafragou 
strangely excludes the cognitive approach to metonymy explicitly. For her, consistency with 
the principle of relevance (according to which the hearer is entitled to assume that the 
intended interpretation of an utterance creates the intended contextual effects for a minimum 
of processing effort) is enough to constrain the number of possible contextual implications 
of a metonymy. However, we are nowhere told what processes, if any, regulate the creation 
of contextual effects. As we have seen, the production of contextual effects is tied to the 
nature of the conceptual mappings involved, and what properties become salient in a mapping 
is to a large extent a matter of consistency between domains6 and of convention. Were a 
mapping not to be conventional or if the hearer had no previous knowledge of the mapping, 
nevertheless, the metaphor or the metonymy would be worked out on the basis of the 
hearer's conventional knowledge about the source and target domains. If none of these 
conditions hold, the metaphor or the metonymy becomes uninterpretable. 
It must be borne in mind that the mappings regulate how contextual implications are 
produced, and that whatever is to be highlighted in a domain, although motivated by the 
mapping, is ultimately determined by the conventional conceptual structure of the domain in 
question. In this comection, our study of the cognitive processes underlying metaphorical 
and metonymic expressions fleshes out the rather vague relevance-theoretic proposition that 
contextual implications are obtained by consistency with the principle of relevance. For 
example, consider the following metonymy : 
(35) You should avoid marrying a sheep at al1 costs (=someone born in the Year of 
the Sheep) 
This metonymy is proposed by Papafragou (1995: 148) as an exarnple of "creative, one- 
off" metonymic use, which cannot be dealt with in terms of conventional inventories of 
metonymic mappings. But it must be noted that this metonymy is virtually impossible to 
interpret unless the hearer has access to a specific, not easily available piece of encyclopedic 
information about the Year of the Sheep (infomation which might as well derive from a 
well-specified context in which, for example, someone had been discussing the characteristics 
of the people born in that year). Once we can constmct the source domain adequately we are 
no longer at a loss as to how to process (35). and the expression fits in nicely with other 
conventionalised ones like You should avoid marrying a Pisces, where the source domain is 
a sign of the zodiac and the target domain is the person born under that sign. Note also that, 
in the absence of the adequate background information, it is still possible for the hearer to 
work out the possible meaning of (35) precisely on the basis of the conventional mapping 
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which we have just described. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have been able to set up the boundaries between metonymy and metaphor, on the 
one hand, and between metonyrny and other semantic phenomena which involve domain 
highlighting, on the other hand. We have also seen the irnportance of making a clear 
difference between predicative and referential uses of metaphoric and metonymic mappings, 
and we have analysed the communicative import of such uses. Our whole account revolves 
around the question of the complementariness between the cognitive and the communicative 
perspectives of metaphor and metonymy. Cognitive processes have not only an organizational 
or structuring purpose of concepts but also a communicative potential which needs to be 
explored. We have suggested that Relevance Theory provides us with the necessary 
conceptual tools to undertake this task and allows us to investigate in great detail the way we 
use metaphoric and metonymic mappings in cornmon every-day language-related inferential 
and referential activities. 
NOTES 
l. Universidad de La Rioja. Departamento de Filologías Modernas. cICigúefia, 60. 26004, Logroíio, La Rioja, 
Spain. e-mail: framiz@siur.uninoja.es; tel. (34) (41) 299433; fax.: (34) (41) 299419. Financia1 suppon for 
this research has been provided by the Universiry of La Rioja. Research De'partment. grant no. 96PYB33JMA. 
2. Naomi Leite has compiled a so far unpublished "Master Metonymy List", with 104 metonimies grouped 
according to different mapping types, which is circulated among Lakoff s students and collaborators. This effon 
tends to resemble [he inicial work made by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) with respect to metaphor where mappings 
were produced on a rather ad hoc basis and were not grouped under more generic headings. However, metaphor 
is being increasingly treated by Lakoff and his collaborators (eg. Lakoff & Tumer, 1989, Lakoff. 1993) in 
terms of more abstract mappings. No effon has been made, to my knowledge, ro explore more generic 
metonimies. 
3.  Note, in contrast, that [he concept of size may never be intrinsic to characrerize a given entity. Thus. [he 
sentence M y  dog is un Alsarian entails that 1 have a large dog but does not necessarily entail that 1 have a large 
animal if compared ro a horse. a cow, or an elephant, for example. Both entailments require that we compare 
Alsatians with other entities. 
4. To give an example of how a contextual irnplication may be derived, imagine that I have a cousin who likes 
bathing in [he sun too long when he goes to [he seaside [o [he extent that he usually gets sunburnr. One day a 
common friend lets me know rhat my cousin is spending the weakend at [he seaside. This information allows 
me to derive [he contextual implication that my cousin is likely to get sunbumt again. 
5 .  Loose uses of language are common. Ir is interesting to note that sometimes we need to make use of hedges 
like "strictly speaking" or  "to be precise" precisely to make it clear that we are not speaking loosely, which is 
rhe normal situation. Thus, we have a tendency to speak in rather vague terms unless there are pressing 
demands in [he speech situation to the contrary. For example, people tend to round off figures rather [han give 
the exact amounts, or to use rather imprecise deictic expressions such as "over there" or "then", instead of 
giving accurate descriptions of time and place locations. 
6. As Lakoff (1990. 1993) has cogently demonstrated there are principles like [he Invariance Principle which 
constrain metaphoric mappings. See Ruiz de Mendoza (1996bc) for discussion. 
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